Category Archive: Camp Security

Brussels attack analysis | get smart fast

Posted on March 27, 2016

Last week’s attack and sorting through the information overload is daunting. We regularly turn to a few knowledgeable sources to help to guide us when we’re perplexed. Here are a few examples:

  1. Foreign Fighters in Syria/Iraq (2012 to 2014) – per million population

    Founded in 1996, the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) is one of the leading academic institutes for counter-terrorism in the world, facilitating international cooperation in the global struggle against terrorism. It is based at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya and includes some of the top experts in terrorism, counter-terrorism, homeland security, threat vulnerability, risk assessment, intelligence analysis, national security and defense policy. See their The Brussels Attacks – What do we know? & Insights from ICT Experts.

  2. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism—better known as START—is a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence headquartered at the University of Maryland comprised of an international network of scholars committed to the scientific study of the causes and human consequences of terrorism in the United States and around the world. See their Terrorism in Belgium and Western Europe; Attacks against Transportation Targets; Coordinated Terrorist Attacks.
  3. The U.S. State Department issued a Travel Alert for Europe cautioning that terrorist groups continue to plan near-term attacks throughout Europe, targeting sporting events, tourist sites, restaurants, and transportation. The State Department also maintains a Worldwide Caution which highlights that all European countries remain vulnerable to attacks from transnational terrorist organizations.
  4. Stratfor is a geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organizations around the world. One of their recent analyses observes, “The Brussels blasts are a striking reminder of the difficulty of preventing attacks against soft targets. Unlike hard targets, which tend to require attackers to use large teams of operatives with elaborate attack plans or large explosive devices to breach defenses, soft targets offer militant planners an advantage in that they can frequently be attacked by a single operative or small team using a simple attack plan. In addition, attacks against transportation-related targets such as metro stations and airports allow attackers to kill large groups of people and attract significant media attention.” Alongside transportation hubs, hotels and restaurants, institutions — such as houses of worship and schools — are classic soft targets. See Brussels Blasts: The Struggle to Secure Soft Targets.
  5. Scott Atran is an anthropologist at France’s National Center for Scientific Research, Oxford University, John Jay College and the University of Michigan and author of Talking to the Enemy and In Gods We Trust. His research specialty is terrorists: how they are recruited, how they think, why are they so effective. He and his team are quite busy these days: he’s embedded with the Peshmerga outside of Mosul interviewing captured (and soon to be executed) ISIL fighters; his team is running experiments in neighborhoods like Molenbeek and around the Bataclan, and tracing out the networks of the friends, family and disciples of the Paris and Brussels terrorists. His, often raw, Facebook posts from the battlefield carry a surrealistic quality. He recently addressed the UN Security Council on The Role of Youth in Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting PeaceWe do not necessarily agree with every one of his conclusions, but he is consistently thoughtful and incisive.

Focus on resources: DHS Protective Security Advisors

Posted on August 03, 2015

PSA imageRecently, we received an inquiry from an out-of-state colleague. Some of his questions could be answered over the phone, but it was clear that an on-site consultation was in order.

I asked my colleague, “Do you know your Protective Security Advisor (PSA)?” He replied, “What?”

DHS employs PSA’s in all 50 states and many states have multiple regions. Our experience here in NY is that our PSA’s are a wonderful resource. They are hard-working, knowledgeable and professional.

  • Security surveys. Subject to time constraints you can ask your PSA to conduct security surveys and assessments of your facilities. We’ve joined our PSA’s during some of these sessions and their suggestions are both sound and pragmatic.
  • Training. PSA’s have access to a wide variety of training options, e.g. active shooters, suspicious packages, severe weather. Even if you don’t know your exact need, talk to them. They can open up a variety of resources for you.
  • Special events planning. Let them know if you are planning a high profile event. They can advise you on security and logistical issues.
  • Outreach. Get on their radar. They will invite you to various trainings and events.

Click here for more information on Protective Security Advisors. To contact your local PSA, please contact PSCDOperations@hq.dhs.gov. To contact NY PSA’s or if you have questions or need other assistance please complete the form below.

Reserve now for April 8th workshop|Emergency Planning for Camps

Posted on March 28, 2013

Seating is limited, click here to RSVP

Camp Security Save the date

Again, active shooters

Posted on July 20, 2012

Our thoughts and prayers are with the victims of the shootings in Colorado. The greatest horror is the realization that such incidents are all-too-easy to commit. How should organizations plan to protect their students, staff, congregants and others?

Recommendations (scroll down for resources)

There are no perfect solutions, but planning and training can mitigate active shooter incidents. The first step is maintaining good access control. Keeping someone who wants to do harm outside is the best way of protecting those inside.

  • Evacuate: Building occupants should evacuate the facility if safe to do so; evacuees should leave behind their belongings, visualize their entire escape route before beginning to move, and avoid using elevators or escalators.
  • Hide: If evacuating the facility is not possible, building occupants should hide in a secure area (preferably a designated shelter location), lock the door, blockade the door with heavy furniture, cover all windows, turn off all lights, silence any electronic devices, lie on the floor, and remain silent.
  • Take Action: If neither evacuating the facility nor seeking shelter is possible, building occupants should attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter by throwing objects, using aggressive force, and yelling.
  • Other considerations?
    • Train building occupants to call 911 as soon as it is safe to do so.
    • Train building occupants on how to respond when law enforcement arrives on scene.
    • follow all official instructions, remain calm, keep hands empty and visible at all times, and avoid making sudden or alarming movements.

Summer camps

Summer camps bring special challenges, especially when the campers are young. Planning and training may be even more critical, but the general guidance remains:

  • Evacuate. Staff should know your plan and be able to evacuate to a safer area, if possible. It will be difficult to run with groups of young children.
  • Hide. Summer camp structures are rarely constructed in a way to withstand an attack by a determined intruder and they rarely have heavy furniture that might be used to blockade a door. If no secure structure is available, consider designating scattered, but assigned, assembly points for each small camper group. By making an intruder search for victims (over many acres of campgrounds)  this tactic buys some of the  time necessary for help to respond. Staff should be prepared with “quiet activities” alternatives. This is a situation when good communication can be the difference between life and death.
  • Take action. The actions available in summer camps are dependent on the ages and abilities of the groups involved.

Resources

Thinking about camp security

Posted on July 24, 2011

Our hearts and prayers go out to the relatives of the victims of the two attacks in Norway.

There is no credible intelligence about any other plans to attack camps, or that there are plans to attack Jewish camps, in particular. Still, it is appropriate for us to ask, what are the lessons learned from the horrific events in Oslo? What are the best practices for camp security — even while the details are still emerging?

  1. Lone wolves are dangerous. Unfortunately, a variety of people hate Jews and might choose Jews as targets. The need for continued vigilance, without any preconceptions as to who might be dangerous, continues.
  2. Beware of hostile surveillance.  Although the details are still emerging, it is unlikely that the island camp attacker did not try to view the grounds before his attack. Camp staff should be aware of the possibility of hostile surveillance and know how to report if something “just doesn’t look right.” See our tips to detect hostile surveillance here.
  3. Camps are a soft target. There are very few camps that are built with adequate perimeter security. At the same time, an intruder is more than likely to enter through the “front”. It is wise to have someone screening those wishing to enter the camp. That person should have a remote “panic alarm” to alert camp staff if anyone suspicious is seeking entry.
  4. It helps to have a plan.Organizations should have plans to cover emergency situations. All too often, something happens and people are unprepared. It’s better to think about what to do when you have time to think, plan and make arrangements.
  5. Know your options. The NYPD has studied the “active shooter” problem. They recommend that people: a) evacuate to a safe area, if possible; b) go to a “safe room” where people can barricade the door and hide in silence (the problem with most camps is that there are very few options); or  c) to take action against the shooter (by acting quickly and aggressively, collectively and with improvised weapons). According to the NYPD study, 46% of the armed intruder incidents ended via “Option C”.
  6. Build and maintain a relationship with your local police.Camp leadership should meet with local police commanders to work out emergency  protocols. The fact that the suspect came dressed as a police officer is especially troubling. Local police should know how to contact camp leadership immediately and alert camp leaders if they are about to enter the camp.
  7. Know who’s in your camp. Camps should develop credentials to be prominently worn by visitors and some support staff (e.g., bus drivers who might not be well known by other staff members). 

Keeping these items in mind can help make it a positive camp season. This blog welcomes other ideas. You can send your questions and your suggestions to pollockd@jcrcny.org.

Posted in Camp Security